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Abstract 
This paper reviews several cases where the Commission presumed that competitively 
selected operators of large infrastructure projects derived an undue advantage from 
state aid. The aid was granted to the owners of the infrastructure to supported 
investment in construction or upgrading. The practice of the Commission is not 
consistent or clear. The paper also shows that under reasonable assumptions, 
competitive selection of operators is indeed capable of eliminating any advantage 
above market rates of return or market rates of cost of capital. The paper 
demonstrates, both theoretically and with the use of numerical examples, that 
concession fees take into account any aid that is granted to the owners of 
infrastructure for its construction or upgrading. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the landmark judgment in the Leipzig-Halle case1, a large literature has evolved 
on whether public funding of infrastructure constitutes state aid or not.2 The 
European Commission now considers any infrastructure which is used to carry out 
an economic activity to be itself economic in nature and any public funding received 
by the owners of the infrastructure to fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
Users who do not pay a market fee are also considered to receive indirect state aid. 
 
In addition, the Commission routinely presumes that operators of infrastructure 
projects, who are different from owners or users, derive an advantage not available 
under normal market conditions. The Commission makes this presumption because 
such projects are partly funded by state aid. Indeed, it is rather natural to believe that 
when a project is partly subsidised by a public authority, the operator of the project 
obtains an advantage. 
 
However, we show in this paper that under reasonable assumptions, competitive 
selection of operators can eliminate any advantage in the sense of receiving a return 
which is above market rates or market rates of cost of capital. The decisive element, 
of course, is the existence of a truly competitive selection procedure. If the procedure 
is defective, discriminatory or opaque, we wholeheartedly agree with the typical 
Commission statement that “an advantage for the chosen operator cannot be 
excluded.” 
 
Therefore, our primary objective in this paper is to demonstrate that in principle the 
Commission is wrong in presuming that competitively selected operators derive an 
advantage in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. We also carry out a review of 
recently authorised measures of support of infrastructure projects and show that the 
Commission treatment of operators is inconsistent and varies without explanation 
from case to case. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we summarise the main 
findings of auction theory which are that, first, different auctioning methods have 
equivalent results and, second, the price bid for an asset is equal to the reservation 
price of the bidder with the highest valuation. Then we apply these insights to the 
auctioning of the right to operate an infrastructure project [i.e. a concession]. We 
also provide numerical examples. Lastly, we review seminal Commission decisions 
and show, first, that the conclusions of the Commission are not always consistent 
and, second, that they diverge without much explanation on the part of the 
Commission from the insights of auction theory. 
 
                                                          
1 See T-443/08, Freistaat Sachsen & Land Sachsen-Anhalt v European Commission. 
2 See, for example, T. Wilson, Infrastructure Financing and State Aid Post Leipzig-Halle, European 
State Aid Law Quarterly, 1/2014, pp. 24-27. For an application of the Leipzig-Halle principles in the 
case of sport infrastructure see R. Craven, State Aid and Sports Stadiums: EU Sports Policy or 
Deference to Professional Football, European Competition Law Review, 2014, vol. 35(9), 453-460. 
Even before the Leipzig-Halle judgment, academic writing questioned the approach of the 
Commission. See, for example, C. Koenig & S. Fechtner, The European Commission's Hidden 
Asymmetric Regulatory Approach in the Field of Broadband Infrastructure Funding, European State 
Aid Law Quarterly, 4/2009, pp. 463-472; C. Koenig, & A. Trías, A New Sound Approach to EC State 
Aid Control of Airport Infrastructure Funding, European State Aid Law Quarterly, 3/2009, pp. 299-
310. 
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2. How auctions work 
 
In order to assign rights or award concessions, public authorities and other 
institutional actors make use of auctions. In order to be a successful public policy 
tool, auctions have to be designed so as to satisfy two principles:3 
 Pareto efficiency: The auction is won by the bidder who assigns the highest value 
to the asset or project. 
 Profit maximization: The auction generates the highest expected profit for the 
seller 
 
While profit maximisation appears as an obvious requirement for a well-designed 
auction, pareto efficiency might not. To see its importance, one should first simply 
understand that assigning an item to someone who has not the highest value for it 
cannot be optimal ex-ante. If the latter happens, then it is possible to make at least 
one person better off without making anyone else worse off. [This is the mirror side 
of the definition of pareto optimality according to which a situation is pareto 
optimum if welfare is maximised so that no one can be made better off]. If the winner 
is not the person with the highest valuation of the asset or item in question, then it is 
possible to make someone better off by asking those who value an item more to 
transfer some money to the person who has actually won the auction – a sum 
between the highest value and the winner’s (lower) value – in order to convince the 
winner to transfer the item to those who care more about it. 
 
The economic analysis of auctions considers the nature of the item which is 
auctioned as well as the rules of bidding. In this context we can make a distinction 
between private-value and common-value auctions. The first represents the case 
where all participants possibly have a different value to the item, depending on their 
strictly personal preferences – their taste for example. In a common-value action 
instead,  there is a market value assigned to the item and participants then make 
offers depending on their estimates of how much the item is actually worth to them. 
Their offers determine to whom the item is assigned but this has the same market 
value regardless of the actual auction winner and of how much has been offered for 
it. 
 
With respect to auction types, the most common is the so-called English auction, 
where everything starts with a reserve price – the lowest price at which the seller is 
willing to start the auction and potentially sell the item. After a process of successive 
(incremental) offers, the auction ends when nobody is willing to bid any further and 
the highest bidder wins the item at a price at least equal to the value assigned by the 
second-highest bidder to the item (second highest price). 
 
Another type of auction is the Dutch auction where we start with a high price which 
the seller gradually lowers until somebody makes an offer. The first offer determines 
the end of the auction. 
 
                                                          
3 For excellent and accessible reviews of the economics of auctions, please see P. Klemperer, Auctions: 
Theory and Practice, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); D. Salant, A Primer on Auction 
Design, Management, and Strategy, (Toulouse, December, 2013). 
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A third type is the sealed-bid auction where each participant writes down a bid on a 
sheet of paper which then gets sealed into an envelope. After all envelopes are 
collected, the item is assigned to the participant with the highest bid. A sealed-bid 
auction may also include a reserve price which implies that if all sealed offers are 
lower than this price, then the auctioned item is left unassigned. 
 
A very frequent variant is the sealed-bid second-price auction also called Vickrey 
auction, where the item is assigned to the highest bidder as usual but at the second 
highest price, i.e. the price equal to the offer of the second highest bidder. 
 
More generally, an auction is defined by a set of rules which identify the bidding 
procedures for the participants as well as the modality through which a bidder 
actually wins an item, and how much has to be paid for it. Those who put the items 
on auction do not normally know the willingness to pay of the participants but have 
only some (probabilistic) expectations. The sellers are of course interested in finding 
auction methods and bidding rules that maximize the expected revenue generated by 
the sale. However, in the case of social planners using auctions to determine to whom 
to assign a certain right / license / concession,  not only the revenue but also 
efficiency issues play an important role. Indeed as already explained, an auction is 
considered to be efficient if it allocates an item to the bidder that values it the most. 
 
In the rare case where the seller knows how much the participants value an item, the 
auction design becomes a simple issue. Indeed the condition of profit maximization 
is respected by simply assigning the item to the bidder with the highest value for it. 
This is also enough for Pareto efficiency. 
 
With respect to the more typical case where the item valuations are not known, 
different considerations have to be made with respect to the different types of 
auction described before. 
 
The most common English auction delivers outcomes in lines with both Pareto 
efficiency and profit maximization. Indeed the auction awards the item to the 
participant with the highest value for it. Interestingly, introducing an ad hoc 
reservation price the seller might gain an even higher revenue than without it. 
However this maximizes only the seller’s expected profits, as it cannot be assumed 
that in every auction participant will bid higher than the reservation price. Therefore 
only an English auction with zero reservation price respects both conditions. 
 
Conversely, in the case of a Dutch auction with no information about item valuations, 
the auctioned item need not be awarded to the bidder with the highest value. The 
same applies to sealed-bid auctions. This is becasue each bidder’s offer depends on 
the beliefs about the other bidders’ valuations for the same item. It is only when 
participants have no expectation about others’ valuations that the item goes to the 
bidder with the highest valuation. 
 
In the sealed-bid Vickrey auction, if all participants bid their true (highest) value the 
item is assigned to the one who values it the most, with a price determined by the 
second-highest price. This is basically the same outcome as that which occurs in the 
English auction.  
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In auctions where participants are charged the second highest price it is optimal to 
state the true value that they assign to the item(s). In order to verify this we can 
consider two participants with possible valuations 𝑉1, 𝑉2 bidding respectively the 
amounts 𝑥1, 𝑥2 for the same item. The expected payoff for the first one is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥1 ≥  𝑥2)[𝑉1 − 𝑥2] 
 
The first term is the probability that the offer of the first participant is the highest 
one. The second is the surplus that this participant receives in case of winning. 
 
Assume initially that 𝑉1 > 𝑥2, i.e. participant 1 values the item more than the highest 
bid of participant 2. In this case it’s rational to assume that the first participant 
would like to have the largest probability of being awarded the item. This is possible 
by bidding 𝑥1 = 𝑉1. 
 
Conversely, in the case where 𝑉1 < 𝑥2, participant 1 would prefer not to receive the 
item as the value assigned to it is lower than the bid made by participant 2. In order 
to minimise the chances of receiving the item, participant 1 has only to bid again an 
amount equal to the true valuation for the item, i.e. 𝑥1 = 𝑉1. 
 
Until now we have focused on participant valuations and offers. Let’s change 
perspective for a moment taking the side of the seller and considering the case where 
the seller may want to set up a competition where participants are granted a certain 
right or concession depending on the value they report for a certain item. In case of 
winning, a price 𝑝 is charged to the winner. 
 
Here the aim is to design a mechanism where participants state their true value and 
the item is awarded to the one with the highest valuation. This is possible by applying 
an appropriate reservation price 𝑝. 
 
Assume again two participants bidding for the same item, with participant 1 having 
the highest valuation for the item, i.e. 𝑉1 > 𝑉2 and suppose that the seller wants to 
induce the highest bidder to reveal his true value and offer accordingly. 
 
As participant 1 has the highest value for the item, this implies that winning the item 
should give him a payoff at least equal to the following amount: 
 
𝑉1 − 𝑝 ≥ 0 
 
On the other hand the payoff of participant 2 should be negative if the orice exceeds 
its valuation. That is: 
 
0 ≥  𝑉2 − 𝑝 
 
The two conditions holding together results in having a price 𝑝 such that 
 
𝑉1 ≥ 𝑝 ≥ 𝑉2 
 
i.e. the reservation price should lie between the highest and the second highest 
valuation for the item. Interestingly this is the same result stemming from the 
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sealed-bid second-price auction and it is proven to maximise both efficiency and 
expected revenue. 
 
In conclusion, auction theory suggests that, under reasonable information and risk 
assumptions, various types of auctions are equivalent and that they induce bidders to 
make offers which are equivalent to their true valuations of the item that is 
auctioned. Under these conditions, the outcome is efficient [i.e. maximises welfare or 
value] and maximises revenue for the seller. 
 
3. Auctioning the right to operate a facility eliminates undue advantage 
 
The previous section explained the basic insights of auction theory. What happens 
when the bidding is for the purpose of choosing the company that is willing to accept 
the lowest compensation or fee in order to build and operate a facility on behalf of a 
public authority? When persons bid for an item they like, they quote as high a price 
as their valuation of that item. But would a competitive procedure induce companies 
to quote the smallest possible fee? We show in this section that this is indeed the 
case. 
 
Assume that a firm incurs net costs C in order to build and operate a project on 
behalf of a public authority. Net costs are the sum of upfront investment costs, 
operating expenditure and any costs for financing the investment minus operating 
revenue. The public authority that owns the project will pay a fee, F, to the operator. 
The fee must cover the net costs, otherwise no private operator would be willing to 
undertake the project. However, the authority does not know the amount of net 
costs. The firm therefore can charge a fee that is equal to F = x + C, where x is an 
amount of profit in excess of the costs incurred by the firm. 
 
The minimum fee that can be charged by the most efficient firm on the market, Fi, 
must be no less than the net costs, Ci, of that firm. However, the maximum fee that 
can be charged by the most efficient firm must be no more than Cj which is equal to 
the net costs incurred by the second most efficient firm on the market. It follows that 
Cj > Fi > Ci. This inequality can be expressed as follows: 
 
Fi = (Cj – Ci) + Ci 
 
Therefore, x = Cj – Ci. If Cj is known with certainty, then x is known with certainty 
and it follows that Fi = Cj. But in reality there is always some uncertainty about the 
costs of competitors. The magnitude of x can only be known probabilistically. If p is 
the probability of guessing the costs of the competitor correctly, then Fi = xp + Ci. If 
p = 1, then Fi = Cj and if p = 0, then Fi = Ci. This means that if the firm is absolutely 
certain about the costs of its competitors it will charge a fee that is equal to the cost of 
the second most efficient firm and if the firm knows absolutely nothing about its 
competitors, it will charge a fee that it is equal to its own costs. 
 
But one may argue, correctly, that firms are not at these two extremes. They always 
have some idea of the costs of their competitors. Hence the fee they will charge will 
be equal to their own costs plus the difference between Cj and Ci multiplied by a 
percentage [which is equal to the probability of knowing correctly competitors’ 
costs]. 
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However, the conclusion above is based on the explicit assumption that the firm is 
the most efficient and on the implicit assumption that other competitors will submit 
fees that correspond to their true costs. What happens when firms are not sure 
whether they are the most efficient on the market and do not know how high or low 
will be the fees submitted by competitors? 
 
Moreover, other firms will naturally also try to figure out where to pitch the fee they 
quote on the basis of their beliefs about what other firms will do. This competitive 
interaction has important consequences. 
 
Assume that there are two firms which are equally efficient. Further assume that 
each firm can choose between two options: quoting a fee that is equal to its own 
costs, indicated as “Low”, and attempting to charge a higher fee that can generate 
some extra profit, indicated as “High”. 
 
Given that the firms participating in the bidding process are competitors, they rank 
the possible outcomes as follows: Win > Draw > Lose. That is, they would like to win 
but still prefer that there is no winner than to be the loser. 
 
A possible pay-off matrix is given below. For two firms with similar costs, if one bids 
high and the other bids low, the latter wins, and vice versa. If both bid either high or 
low, neither wins, and the outcome is a draw [D]. 
 
 
 Firm j 
 
Firm i 
 High Low 
High D, D L, W 
Low W, L D, D 
 
 
The optimum strategy for each firm is to bid low [in our example, the outcome is 
D,D]. It is easy to explain why this is true for firm i. The same logic applies to firm j. 
Consider the reasoning of firm i. If firm j bids high, firm i wins by bidding low. If, by 
contrast, firm j bids low, firm i, forces a draw by bidding low too. It follows that 
irrespective of what firm j does, firm i will bid low. And so will do firm j. 
 
We have shown in this section that under fairly reasonable assumptions about 
uncertainty concerning the true level of competitors’ costs, a competitive selection 
procedure drives bidders to quote prices which are very close or equal to their costs. 
It is only when firms have information about the true costs of competitors that the 
competitive process will not equalise quoted prices or fees with the costs of the most 
efficient firm. But at minimum, it will drive quoted prices or fees to the level of the 
second most efficient firm. 
 
However, even when the fee is reduced to the level of the second most efficient firm, 
we still have an outcome which is the most likely to occur under normal market 
conditions. If firms know the level of the true costs of their competitors they will not 
price below that level. Therefore, the overall conclusion we can draw is that a 
competitive selection procedure forces firms to behave in the same way as they would 
on the market. 
 
8 
 
4. Concession fees and the cost of capital 
 
In this section we show that competitive selection of operators eliminates profit in 
excess of market rates, i.e. any advantage that could not be obtained under normal 
market conditions which is the meaning of advantage in Article 107(1) TFEU.  
 
Now we assume that a project generates revenue that may or may not cover its 
investment and operating costs. In the case that the revenue covers all costs, a firm 
that is granted the concession to build and operate a facility will be prepared to pay 
to the public authority that owns the facility a concession fee that is equal to the net 
revenue. But in case the revenue falls short of the total costs, the concessionaire will 
demand a subsidy. 
 
We show that the concession fee which is paid by a concessionaire to the public 
authority eliminates any advantage that may be derived from the state aid which is 
granted in order to make the project commercially viable. In other words, even 
though state aid is necessary for the project to break even, the operator obtains no 
advantage above the market rate of return for its capital. 
 
The concession fee 
 
Let V be the value that an investor attaches to a project. If there are no linkages 
between this project and other projects, then at maximum, this value must be V = R 
– C, where R is operating revenue and C is operating cost. 
 
If a fee, F, is charged for the right to operate the project, then the maximum fee that 
the investor is prepared to pay must be F = V. 
 
As shown in the previous sections, under competitive conditions and uncertainty 
about the offers of other potential bidders for the project, the investor will make an 
offer which is equal to the maximum fee that he is prepared to pay, which in turn 
must be equal to the expected net revenue. 
 
If the project is a concession where revenue can be generated only after an initial 
investment by the successful bidder, the maximum concession fee is: 
 
F = R – C – I – rI = R – C – I(1 + r) = R – C – I(1 + r) 
 
where I is the amount of the necessary investment and r, expressed as a %, is the cost 
of funding that investment [it is equal to the rate of interest of a commercial loan or 
the required rate of return on equity]. 
 
[In practice, concession contracts are awarded for multi-year periods. Future 
revenue and costs have to be discounted to present values. But here we assume, for 
simplicity, that everything takes place within the same time period. This 
simplification facilitates exposition but does not detract from the logic of the 
calculations.] 
 
If a public authority provides a subsidy S to reduce the cost of the initial investment, 
then: 
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Fs = R – C – (I – S)(1 + r) = (R – C – I(1 + r)) + S(1 + r) = F + S(1 + r) 
 
where Fs is the fee when a subsidy is granted. 
 
By comparing F and Fs, we see that Fs > F. Not only is the fee higher as a result of the 
subsidy, but rather surprisingly, the fee increases by more than the amount of the 
subsidy! It will incorporate the amount of interest that the successful bidder will be 
able to earn on the money that it can keep in the bank instead of investing it in the 
project. A competitive process eliminates the advantage conferred by the subsidy. 
 
Indeed, by differentiating Fs with respect to the subsidy, S, we see that 
 
(dFs/dS) = 1 + r > 0 
 
That is, the amount of subsidy has a constant relationship with the fee, which is equal 
to one plus the cost of capital. 
 
Funding gap 
 
The intervention of a public authority to support the construction of infrastructure is 
needed when there is a funding gap, G, which is 
 
G = R – C – I(1 + r) < 0 
 
The net revenue generated by the project is less than the required up-front 
investment. In principle, the maximum amount of subsidy, S, is that which 
eliminates the funding gap and makes it possible for a private investor to undertake 
the project. That is, 
 
R – C – (I – S)(1 + r) = 0 
 
Indeed, in practice, public authorities intervene only when there is a funding gap, G. 
But offering a subsidy to bridge the gap, such that S = – G, is not a smart strategy. 
The funding authority is likely to know only the required up-front investment and 
the expected revenue, but is not likely to know the operating costs of the prospective 
operator of the infrastructure or its costs of capital. 
 
It must, therefore, organise a competitive procedure to award the contract to the 
bidder that will offer the highest fee, F, which would reflect the true costs and 
expected efficiencies of each bidder. 
 
Now, assume that a funding authority offers subsidy, S*, that it believes it eliminates 
the funding gap but it cannot be sure about it because it does not know the true 
future costs of the winning bidder. [The superscript * indicates amounts calculated 
by the public authority.] If the amount of S* is correctly calculated, then the fee must 
be zero 
 
F* = R* – C* – (I* – S*)(1 + r*) = 0 
 
But assume that C” < C* [The superscript ” indicates the bidder’s true costs.] The fee 
that would be quoted by the successful bidder would be 
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F” = R* – C” – (I* – S*)(1 + r*) 
 
By comparing F* and F”, it follows that F” > F* because 
 
R* – C” – (I* – S*)(1 + r*) > R* – C* – (I* – S*)(1 + r*) 
 
or, – C” > – C* which leads to C” < C* which is true [defined as such]. 
 
Once more, it becomes obvious that the competitive process corrects the mistakes of 
the funding authority and removes any advantage that is conferred by any excess 
subsidy. 
 
Numerical examples 
 
The principles derived above can be illustrated with a few numerical examples that 
show how the fee varies with the extent of the funding gap and the amount of the 
subsidy. 
 
Case 1: No funding gap, no state aid [R = 130, C = 20, I = 100, r = 5%] 
F = 130 – 20 – 100(1.05) = 5 
 
Case 2: No funding gap, state aid of 80 [R = 130, C = 20, I = 100, r = 5%] 
F = 130 – 20 – 100(1.05) + 80(1.05) = 5 + 84 = 89 
The fee rises not just with the reduction in costs but also incorporates the extra 
benefit that the investor enjoys by keeping the money (80) in the bank! 
 
Case 3: Funding gap of 25, no state aid [R = 100, C = 20, I = 100, r = 5%] 
F = 100 – 20 – 100(1.05) = 80 – 105 = – 25 
This means that the project will not be undertaken. The public authority has to pay 
25 to the operator to make the project viable. 
 
Case 4: Funding gap of 90, state aid of 80 [R = 35, C = 20, I = 100, r = 5%] 
F = 35 – 20 – 100(1.05) + 80(1.05) = 15 – 105 + 84 = 6 
The state aid of 80 is excessive. The investor pays back 6 in terms of a fee. 
 
Case 5: Same as above, but now there are two bidders, one with r1 = 5% and another 
with r2 = 7%. Their respective fees are F1 = 6 and F2 = 4.4. The winner is the bidder 
with the lower cost of capital. Once more, the competitive process eliminates the 
advantage from the lower cost of capital. 
 
5. The practice of the Commission 
 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the Commission practice is 
defective because it fails to take fully into account the impact of competitive 
selection. The Commission does not explain why competitive selection is not 
sufficient to remove any advantage. In all cases reviewed in this section there was 
state aid to the entity that owned the infrastructure. The Commission’s assessment of 
the existence of state aid at the level of the owner was undoubtedly correct. The 
owners of subsidised assets did derive an undue advantage not available under 
normal market conditions. However, as explained in earlier sections, the presence of 
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state aid for the owner does not necessarily entail an advantage for the operator who 
is competitively selected. 
 
Moreover, the Commission practice is not consistent. To prove this claim, we quote 
below the relevant excerpts from several recent Commission decisions. As will be 
seen, it is not clear why in certain cases the Commission cannot exclude the presence 
of undue advantage. Perhaps the facts in those cases are such that the Commission 
was right to conclude that there was advantage in the meaning of Article 107(1) 
TFEU. However, the explanations are brief and incomplete in the sense that it is not 
obvious to the reader which factors influenced the Commission’s findings. Hence, not 
only are there inconsistencies, but there is also unexplained variation from case to 
case. 
 
But before we examine the decisional practice of the Commission, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that the Commission does appreciate that what matters is whether an 
operator obtains a return that covers its cost of capital. The following is from a 
Commission decision SA.33988 concerning exclusive rights to OPAP, a Greek 
undertaking, to operate games of chance:4 
“(28) The Commission considers that the presence of an economic advantage, within 
the meaning of article 107(1) TFEU, can only be excluded in the case at stake, if the 
Greek State, …, leaves OPAP with the minimum return necessary for an average 
company to cover its operational and capital costs.” 
“(29) By allowing OPAP to keep only such reasonable return out of the revenues 
generated by the operation of the games and the gaming machines, the State will 
ensure that the operator does not earn more (in terms of return rate) than in a 
normal market situation.” 
“(30) “[…] based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital of OPAP should range between […] and […]. This range […] therefore 
corresponds to the maximal Internal Rate of Return that could be left to OPAP as a 
reasonable return to avoid granting any economic advantage to the operator.” 
 
It is puzzling why the Commission does not apply these principles to all cases. 
 
5.1 Cases where no advantage was found 
 
Commission Decision SA.36346, land development scheme for industrial 
and commercial use, Germany5 
Developers 
“(39) In so far as developers are involved, according to the provisions of the measure, 
they would always be selected through an open, transparent and non-discriminatory 
public procurement procedure and thus provide their services against a market 
conform fee. Under these conditions, there is no advantage within the meaning of 
Article 107(1) TFEU to developers.” [Emphasis added. The same applies to all other 
quotations in this section.] 
 
SA.35440, multifunktionsarena der Stadt Jena6 
                                                          
4 The text of the decision can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/242851/242851_1381586_227_1.pdf 
5 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/248011/248011_1534293_255_2.pdf 
6 It can be accessed at: 
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Management of the arena  
“(13) The management company, which the City of Jena will contract to market the 
stadium for professional users and to assist in the organisation of their events, enters 
into a commercial service contract with the municipality. The contract will be 
concluded following a tender procedure which also includes the requested 
management fee and will include incentives for this company to maximise income for 
the City of Jena. There is nothing which suggests that the management company will 
benefit from an exceedingly high management fee which would not any more reflect 
market terms. It is thus not benefiting from aid.” 
 
SA.38302, port of Salerno7 
“(21) The PAS shall organise public, open and non-discriminatory tenders for the 
selection of terminal operators, in accordance with EU public procurement law. ...  
The Italian authorities also confirmed that the tenders for the concession contracts 
will comply with the EU and Italian public procurement legislation and that a large 
degree of advertising will be ensured.” 
 
“(22) According to the Italian authorities, the above-mentioned public tender 
procedures will ensure that the resulting concession fees to be paid by the future 
concessionaires will be in line with the market price. In particular, the Italian 
authorities have committed themselves to cross-check the concession fees resulting 
from such tenders according to the method of discounted cashflow and to conduct a 
comparative analysis with fees paid for similar concession contracts in other Italian 
and foreign ports.” 
 
Concessionaires 
“(46) As the Italian authorities declare, future concessionaires will be chosen on the 
basis of public, open and non-conditional tenders, in compliance with EU public 
procurement law. The award criteria will be transparent and non-discriminatory, and 
will ensure that the economically-most-advantageous offers shall be chosen. The 
Italian authorities have also committed that such tender procedures will result in 
concession fees in line with market prices. In particular, the Italian authorities will 
cross-check the concession fees resulting from such tenders and will conduct a 
comparative analysis with fees paid for similar concession contracts in other Italian 
and foreign ports. These procedures will therefore exclude any economic advantage 
in favour of the future concessionaires.” 
 
Port users 
“(47) The Commission observes that since the tender procedures will exclude any 
economic advantage in favour of the future concessionaires, no advantage will be 
granted at the level of end-users. The Italian authorities also declare that the end-
users shall enjoy equal and non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure.” 
 
5.2 Cases where advantage could not be excluded 
 
SA.36953, port of Bahía de Cádiz8 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/245993/245993_1426021_127_2.pdf 
7 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/251758/251758_1536127_128_2.pdf 
8 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/249217/249217_1481221_99_2.pdf 
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Concessionaire 
(39) The concession contract for the operation of the new container terminal shall be 
concluded on the basis of a public, open and non-conditional tender, in compliance 
with EU public procurement law.  
 
“(40) The above-described administrative contracting procedures shall observe 
transparency and non-discrimination criteria, and the economically-most-
advantageous offers shall be chosen. Therefore, assuring that the tendering 
procedure will comply with those criteria, it will exclude or minimise the economic 
advantage in favour of the future concessionaire (i.e. the advantage, if any, will be the 
minimum necessary to ensure the actual operation of the infrastructure).” 
 
[In this case the Commission is particularly obtuse. It says that competitive selection 
can eliminate or minimise advantage without indicating under which conditions 
either possibility can actually occur.] 
 
Commission Decision 2014/297, multifunctional arena in Copenhagen9 
Operation of the arena 
“(43) The selected operator will pay rent consisting of an annual fixed rent of […] and 
a variable rent […]. The operator must also pay […] due under the lease and thus the 
operator effectively pays all variable costs as part of the lease, including maintenance 
costs. The lease is concluded for a term of […] years (all bids had to be for at least 25 
years and the operator has explained that long term contracts from 20-30 years are 
not unusual in this business).” 
 
“(44) While these arrangements minimise the advantage to the selected operator to 
the minimum necessary to ensure operation of the infrastructure, an advantage to 
the operator of this new arena cannot be excluded. However, given that such aid 
would be compatible with the internal market, as demonstrated below, it is not 
necessary to make a definitive finding about the existence of aid.” 
 
Commission Decision 2013/452, arena in Uppsala10 
Operation of the arena 
“(40) With regards to the lease agreement between the municipality and the Events 
Company for the use of 20% of the total arena capacity, it shall be for 25 years with a 
rent of SEK 15 million per year (or EUR 1.7 million). Sweden has declared that: (i) 
the municipality will pay an hourly rent that is 40 to 50% lower than the rent that the 
Events Company will pay the Property Company for their use of the arena (ii) the 
difference between the rent that the municipality and the Events Company pays will 
increase over time; and (iii) the Events Company will charge market rents to other 
users.” 
 
“(41) While these arrangements minimise the advantage to the Events Company to 
the minimum necessary to ensure operation of the infrastructure, an advantage to 
the operator of this new arena within the market for operating such facilities cannot 
be excluded. However, given that such aid would be compatible with the internal 
                                                          
9 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/244149/244149_1320462_40_5.pdf 
10 it can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/244148/244148_1320500_16_2.pdf 
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market, as demonstrated below, it is not necessary to make a definitive finding about 
the existence of aid.” 
 
SA.36223, port of Santa Cruz of Tenerife11 
Concessionaires 
“(50) With respect to the rental of the infrastructures resulting from the project to 
service providers, as explained in recitals (13)-(16) above, the PSCT shall conclude 
administrative concession contracts on the basis of procedures regulated by the 
Spanish framework law on ports LEPEYMM. First, the PSCT shall organised open 
and non-discriminatory tenders for the rental of those port infrastructures which are 
destined to the provision of port services of general use, as well as for the rental of 
the freight terminal (Article 86 LEPEYMM). Secondly, functional areas over 2 500 
sqm which do not fall into one of the categories for which the public tender is 
obligatory under Article 86 LEPEYMM shall nevertheless be rented following a 
'project competition' administrative procedure, based on the criteria defined in 
Article 85 LEPEYMM. Thirdly, functional areas below 2 500 sqm shall be rented 
directly, but on the basis of rental price established though an expertise carried out 
according to criteria aimed at establishing the market value of these functional areas, 
as required by Article 83 LEPEYMM.” 
 
“(51) The above-described administrative contracting procedures shall observe 
transparency and non-discrimination criteria, and the economically-most 
advantageous offers shall be chosen. Therefore, without the need to take a definitive 
view on the qualification of the measure as aid, these procedures will tend to 
minimise the economic advantage in favour of the future service providers (i.e. the 
advantage will be the minimum necessary to ensure the actual operation of the 
infrastructure).” 
 
Port users 
“(52) With regard to the end users of the new infrastructure, the Commission 
observes that they shall enjoy equal and non-discriminatory access to the new 
infrastructure. Moreover, the various port service providers will have to base their 
pricing policy vis-à-vis end users on economic considerations in order to obtain 
sufficient revenues to be able to pay for the concession fees applicable to them and to 
also make a profit. Those concession fees will be established according to procedures 
ensuring that the aid elements benefitting the concessionaires, if any, are limited to 
the minimum. In the light of the above the Commission concludes that any potential 
advantage in favour of end users will be granted on non–discriminatory terms and 
will be minimised (i.e. it will be the minimum necessary to ensure the actual use of 
the infrastructure, while ensuring the profitability of the concessionaires).” 
 
SA. 34940, port of Augusta12 
Contractors and terminal operators 
“(60) Even though, the best modality for ensuring that the concession price to be 
paid by the current operator for the use of the new infrastructure will be market-
conform would be to organise an open, public, and non-discriminatory tender, taking 
                                                          
11 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/248020/248020_1453836_60_2.pdf 
12 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/246189/246189_1407362_66_2.pdf 
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into account the overlap between Intervention 2 and the concession contract 
currently entrusted to that private operator that will expire in 2021 and the fact that 
its concession fee will be adapted upwards to reflect the expected cash flow, which 
must be calculated on the basis of solid and reliable assumptions, the Commission 
concludes that those arrangements provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that any 
potential advantage granted to that operator will be minimised (i.e. will be the 
minimum necessary to ensure the actual operation of the infrastructure).” 
 
“(61) Finally, the Italian authorities also indicated that the current concessionaire 
will also have the possibility to participate in the public, open, and non-
discriminatory tenders for the use of the other infrastructures built through this 
project, once the works for their construction are concluded (end 2015). For this 
scenario, it is noted, similarly to the above findings regarding the future new 
concessionaires, that participation in the tender procedure will minimise any 
potential economic advantage in favour of the future concessionaires.” 
 
5.3 Cases where advantage was present 
 
SA.35135, multifunktionsarena der Stadt Erfurt13 
 
Operator of the arena 
“(10) The infrastructure is put at the disposal of an undertaking which will let it to 
various users against remuneration. This operating company may exploit the arena, 
although the full costs of building the infrastructure are not passed on to it. It is thus 
saving costs in comparison to a situation which would reflect commercial terms. 
Although the private partner of the operating company will be chosen as a result of 
an open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure (ensuring that it does not 
receive more than a normal market return for its activity and thus excluding 
overcompensation), an advantage would be present for the operating company; the 
rent will not include the recovery of the full costs of building the infrastructure, 
which is used by the operating company for carrying out its economic activity, and 
the city will refund the operator for the low fees it is asked to request from non-
commercial users, an income it would not have without this financial intervention. 
Therefore, the operator enjoys an economic advantage from state resources. The 
operator is thus the beneficiary of aid.” 
 
SA.37373, ice ring14 
Construction 
“(50) At the infrastructure level, state aid can only be excluded if the circumstances 
correspond to normal market conditions. Given that Thialf OG BV will make use of a 
restricted European public procurement procedure to select the building company, 
this condition is fulfilled.” 
 
Operation 
“(51) Nevertheless, the aid measure will alter existing market conditions at the level 
of the operation and use of the renovated arena. The availability of upgraded ice 
                                                          
13 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/245994/245994_1426005_90_2.pdf 
14 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/250448/250448_1502751_94_2.pdf 
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skating infrastructure would allow both the operating company and the users of the 
ice arena (including professional users) to benefit from facilities that would not be 
available on market terms. This operating company and at least some of the 
professional users of the upgraded infrastructure are in competition with other 
undertakings. Therefore the measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in 
the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU.” 
 
“(54) The Commission therefore considers the contribution to the renovation of the 
Thialf ice arena to be state aid in the sense of Article 107 (1) TFEU. The beneficiaries 
of this aid include Thialf OG and possibly the operating company of the arena and its 
professional users. The extent of the potential advantage which the operator and the 
users of the arena receive, if any, is uncertain. However, if the aid can be considered 
compatible with the internal market, ... it is not necessary to make a definitive 
finding about the existence of aid to the operating company and the professional 
users.” 
 
SA.33045, Kristall Bäder15 
“(37) As the expected revenues (in this case, the advanced payment of the concession 
fees of EUR 6.124 million paid by the concessionaire to the Municipality as a 
contribution to the initial investment) do not cover the full investment costs of the 
project (EUR 12.124 million), it must be concluded that a private investor would not 
have undertaken it. Even taking into account the fact that this project avoided the 
costs incurred in case of closure of the complex Trimini and the fact that the 
Municipality would be the owner of the complex after 25 years of concession without 
any obligation towards the concessionaire no private investor would have undertaken 
such a project. Indeed, the public authorities had three options (as detailed in the 
following developments, see recitals 44 to 47). No private operator would have 
chosen continuing the activities of Trimini (which would have entailed EUR 25 
million of losses). Furthermore, the difference between the cost of the option of 
closing Trimini by dismantling it (EUR 5 541 000) and the one of investing into 
modernisation and extension (EUR 6 830 795) would amount to EUR 1 289 795. It 
does not result from the information taken into account by the German authorities 
that the net residual value of the Trimini complex after 25 years (taking into account 
the dismantling/ demolition costs and the costs of dismissing 33 employees) would 
be higher than EUR 1 289 795. It must be concluded that in this case the public 
funding does not take place on terms that would have been acceptable to a private 
investor, and the measure therefore confers an economic advantage to the new 
Trimini complex.” 
 
[Here it must be observed that the Commission does not even make a distinction 
between the owner of the Trimini complex – which was the Municipality – and the 
concessionaire who was selected competitively.] 
 
SA.35738, port of Katakolo16 
Owner-operator 
                                                          
15 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/247490/247490_1580456_110_2.pdf 
16 It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/246700/246700_1444527_188_2.pdf 
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“(49) In the case at hand, the financial data show a negative value of the FNPV, i.e. 
the expected revenues do not cover the investment costs of the project. Given the 
results of the financial analysis provided by the Greek authorities, it must be 
concluded that the investment would not have been undertaken by a private investor. 
Therefore, the notified measure provides PMPF [owner-operator] with an advantage 
that it would not have received under normal market condition.” 
 
“(50) Therefore, in the light of the above and of the fact that the Greek authorities do 
not claim that the market investor test is met, it must be concluded that in this case 
the State did not act as a market investor, and the measure confers an economic 
advantage to the PMPF.” 
 
[This is perhaps the only case where it was clear that the operator received state aid. 
The reason was that the operator was also the owner of the port.] 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have reviewed a number of cases where the Commission presumed 
that operators of large infrastructure projects derived an undue advantage from state 
aid that partly supported investment in those projects, despite the fact that the 
operators were competitively selected. We show that the practice of the Commission 
is not consistent or clear. Occasionally, it also finds that competitive selection of 
operators eliminates any undue advantage. Yet, the Commission does not sufficiently 
explain why competitive selection is capable of eliminating advantage in some cases, 
while in others it is not. 
 
More importantly, we have also shown that under reasonable assumptions, 
competitive selection of operators is indeed capable of eliminating any advantage 
above market rates of return or market rates of cost of capital. The decisive element, 
of course, is the existence of a truly competitive procedure. If the procedure is 
defective or discriminatory and opaque, an advantage for the chosen operator cannot 
be excluded. 
 
We have also demonstrated, both theoretically and with the use of numerical 
examples, that concession fees take into account any aid that is granted to the owners 
of infrastructure for its construction or upgrading. Therefore, the single most 
important conclusion from our analysis is that competitive selection of operators is 
sufficient to eliminate any advantage that is conferred by state aid to the owners of 
infrastructure. 
 
 
 
